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states todecidewhethervictim impactevidenceisrelevanttothesentencer's
decision whether or not to impose the death penalty.
Virginia case and statutory law still prohibit this type ofevidence. In
Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (Va. 1929), the
supreme court held that sympathy for the victims of crime "in no way
assists in determining either the guilt or innocence of the accused." 149
S.E. at 415. Likewise, Virginia's two statutory aggravating factors -

vileness and future dangerousness - which define relevance of the
Commonwealth's evidence at the penalty trial relate only to the personal
blameworthiness of the defendant in accord with Booth and Gathers.
Therefore, to date the Payne rule is not the law of Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles

STAMPER v. MUNCIE
944 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS
In 1978, Charles Sylvester Stamper was tried and convicted on
three counts of felony murder and four associated felony counts in
Henrico County, Virginia. The appeals process has consistently
affirmed Stamper's trial court death sentence.
Stamper was a cook at Shoney's Restaurant where three employees were found shot to death at close range during the course of a
robbery from the restaurant safe. A great deal of circumstantial
evidence tied Stamper to the scene. A car resembling his was spotted
at the time of the murders in the vicinity of the crime; the glass door
to the restaurant was broken from the inside, out; glass particles were
found on the floor of the defendant's car, 20% of which matched in
optical properties the glass of the door; a set of keys of one of the
murder victims was found near the home of Stamper's parents; a gun
found near the home of Stamper's parents was the same type as that
used to kill the victims and the bullets which had been shot from that
gun were of the same type as those found in the victims; Stamper paid
off a good deal of indebtedness within two days of the crime.
Stamper's case was remanded twice by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit for failure to exhaust state remedies and a full
decade after his trial, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
U.S. District Court. The petition was denied.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief.
Stamper assigned three general counts of error which were all rejected. The court summarily dismissed as a matter of law Stamper's
first assertion that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of its circumstantial nature. Second, the court found no clear error concerning
Stamper's position that he had ineffective assistance of counsel
during voir dire. Finally, the court found no error regarding the
judge's response to a juror's question posed to the court.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Stamper raised a number of issues and grounds for relief. Some
of these the court treated in a summary fashion, did not involve capital
penalty law, or revolved around facts peculiar to the case and are
unlikely to arise often. These items are not discussed here.
A. Circumstantial Evidence Standard
While it is well established that circumstantial evidence may be
used as probative and meaningful in a criminal case, the law in

Virginia seems to require that a trier of fact relying on circumstantial
evidence must, in fact, exclude every other reasonable possibility
except guilt. This rule was promulgated by the Virginia Supreme
Court which held that circumstantial evidence may be used in a
criminal case "provided it is of such convincing character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is
guilty." Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 313 S.E.2d 382
(1984) (emphasis in original). Attesting to this standard, the Virginia
Court of Appeals has held that "[w]here the evidence is wholly
circumstantial, a conviction can be obtained only if the evidence is
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, and excludes
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Beck v. Commonwealth,
2 Va. App. 170, 342 S.E.2d 642 (1986).
The circuit court, however, may have applied a different standard
in Stamper than the one handed down in the foregoing cases. The
Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution is not constitutionally required to negate every hypothesis except that of guilt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Interestingly, the court cited no
Virginia law to substantiate this conclusion. It pointed out that the
Tenth Circuit has ruled that "circumstantial evidence need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not
negate all possibilities save guilt." UnitedStatesv. Gay, 774 F.2d 368,
373 (10th Cir. 1985). The court also relied upon Fifth Circuit and
Seventh Circuit opinions to support its position. Based on those
holdings, the circuit court in Stamplerfound that a rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
because the evidence sufficiently supported such inferences.
Stamper argued that, given the facts in his case, no rational trier
of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or conclude that he
was the trigger man. A Jackson analysis may allow a court to make
such a finding, but the Virginia rules may not. The Fourth Circuit's
dismissal of Stamper's contention based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jackson and the other circuit courts'
holdings may be a misapplication of the law given the Virginia rules
promulgated in Dukes and Beck.
The question is whether a conclusion that a rational trier of fact
could find guilt is the complete equivalent of excluding every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. If it is true, under Jackson, that federal
due process as a general proposition might not require exclusion of
every hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt as Virginia
state cases do require, a separate violation of due process may occur
through the arbitrary administration of state created rights. This is the
result if the Fourth Circuit failed to apply a Virginia evidentiary
standard which is more liberal than that applied by the United States
Supreme Court. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
Konrad, FederalDue ProcessandVirginia'sArbitraryAbrogationof
CapitalDefendant's State Created Rights, Capital Defense Digest,
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Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 16 (1991).
B. Witherspoon/Witt Standard
The standard for questioning members of the venire with regard
to their opinions of the imposition of the death penalty at the time of
Stamper's trial was set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968). Witherspoon stands for the proposition that a prospective
juror cannot be excused from jury service on the basis of her scruples
against imposition of the death penalty unless (1) she would automatically vote against death without regard to the evidence, or (2) her
attitude would prevent the making of an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt. That standard was subsequently modified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Witt allowed exclusion of
prospective jurors when their beliefs regarding capital punishment,
either way, would substantially impair their ability to follow their
instructions and render a fair and impartial verdict.
The lower standard should disqualify a greater number of jurors
with reservations about the death penalty. It should also make it easier
for defense attorneys to exclude potential jurors on the basis of their
pro-death inclinations. Even under Witherspoon, however, jurors

who are irrevocably pro-death are not qualified to sit. The Virginia
Supreme Court has recognized that "the process of selection of an
impartial jury permits elimination for cause of those veniremen who
are biased in favor of the death penalty under all circumstances as well
as those who are biased against its imposition under all circumstances." Pattersonv. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 659, 283 S.E.2d
212, 216 (1981). Stamper was unsuccessful in urging that his counsel
was ineffective for failure to explore this possibility.
It is important to remember, though, that the "reverse Witt"
inquiry to identify jurors who are substantially impaired by their
views from considering evidence supporting a life sentence should be
undertaken as a part of every capital jury selection process. Defense
counsel should make such challenges at trial and not wait for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under habeas. Denial of a
"reverse Witt" challenge for cause at trial is a better appellate issue
than a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the
challenge or undertake "reverse Witt" examination.
Summary and analysis by:
Laura J. Fenn

FITZGERALD v. THOMPSON
943 F.2d 463 (1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS

HOLDING

A Virginia jury convicted Edward B. Fitzgerald of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, a rape. Virginia Code §
18.2-31(5). On direct appeal, both the Virginia Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction.
State collateral proceedings also failed to afford relief to Fitzgerald.
On federal collateral proceedings, the district court dismissed
Fitzgerald's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and this appeal
followed.
At the guilt phase of the trial, the principal witnesses against
Fitzgerald were his codefendant, Daniel Johnson, and a prison cellmate,
Wilbur Caviness. Fitzgerald's attorney made a specific request for
evidence relating to the credibility of the Commonwealth's witnesses.
The Commonwealth attorney refused to disclose any credibility
information, claiming that impeachment information was not discoverable. Although the Commonwealth's position was incorrect as a
matter of law, Gigliov. UnitedStates,405 U.S. 150 (1972), Fitzgerald's
attorney made no objection.
Fitzgerald was convicted after ajury instruction that "a person is
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." Although
this instruction shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant plainly a violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) defense counsel made no objection.
At the penalty phase, the jury sentenced Fitzgerald to death,
basing its decision on the defendant's future dangerousness "and/or"
the vileness of the murder. The trial judge asked the jury foreman
which word, "and" or "or" was a correct statement of the jury's
position. The foreman responded that the jury had found future
dangerousness or vileness. The judge sent the jury back to the jury
room to choose which factor was the basis for its decision. The jury
again stated its decision with the word "or." After the judge reinstructed
the jury, they again sentenced Fitzgerald to death, this time basing its
decision on the "vileness" factor alone.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Fitzgerald's petition, in part finding his Giglio claim procedurally barred and in part
ruling against the claim on the merits. The court also rejected
Fitzgerald's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, including the
attorney's failure to object to a Sandstrom error. Finally, the court
rejected Fitzgerald's claim that the trial judge's statements to the jury
foreman regarding the verdict form in effect directed a penalty of
death.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A.

Giglio claim

The Fourth Circuit held that Fitzgerald's claim regarding the
Commonwealth's failure to disclose credibility information was
procedurally barred. Fitzgeraldv. Thompson, 943 F.2d 463,466 (4th
Cir. 1991). The court applied the test of Coleman v. Thompson, 111
U.S. 2546 (1991), and ruled that Fitzgerald had not shown sufficient
"cause" for the default.
Caviness testified at trial that Fitzgerald had admitted killing the
victim. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked several questions to impeach Caviness' credibility. Caviness testified that he had
only one prior felony conviction, that no charges were pending
against him, and that he had been offered nothing in exchange for his
testimony. In fact, Caviness had previously been convicted of three
felonies, two more charges were pending against him, and he had
received reimbursement for expenses of testifying. The
Commonwealth's attorney made no attempt to correct the inaccurate
statements as required by Giglio.
The Fourth Circuit viewed the record as a whole, addressing the
merits of this portion of Fitzgerald's Giglio claim, and found no
"reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury." Fitzgerald,943 F.2d at 467 (quoting United

